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This paper identifies a negative effect when a firm sells warranty. When offer to buy a warranty, consumers’ betrayal aversion is
activated and their trust in the brand decreases. This effect of betrayal aversion is found to be moderated by the relationship norm
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many brands sell extended warranties as add-on services to 
their customers to provide extra coverage on top of the base war-
ranty. Since its sales often contribute more to firms’ profits than the 
sales of the original products (Chen at al. 2009), such developments 
are not surprising. Despite the importance of extended warranties, 
knowledge about its consequences on the brand, however, is scarce 
at best. Prior research either took a descriptive perspective by exam-
ining which customer segments were particularly inclined to make 
extended warranty purchases (Chen et al. 2009) or exclusively fo-
cused on the positive signaling effects of bundling the base warranty 
with a product (Bearden and Shimp 1982; Shimp and Bearden 1982). 
In the latter, it is argued that such a strategy sends positive signals 
(Lutz 1989) because only high quality brands are able to provide it 
without extra charges (Boulding and Kirmani 1993). How do con-
sumers react to the brand having been offered an extended warranty? 
The positive signaling literature suggests that brand trust would in-
crease if a base warranty is bundled with the sales of the product. 
However, we expect brand trust to be shaken if firms intend to sell 
extended warranty separately.
Two potential mechanisms might be responsible for this det-
rimental effect. First, the mere mentioning of a warranty may re-
mind consumers that there is a certain risk involved with the product 
(Grewal, Gotlieb and Marmorstein 1994). Alternatively, consumers 
may also interpret the sales of an extended warranty as an attempt to 
exploit them, thereby activating their innate betrayal aversion (e.g., 
Gershoff and Koehler 2011). Our research aims to examine the latter, 
while ruling out the former. Building on work from Grayson, John-
son, and Chen (2008), we make a distinction between generic con-
cepts of trust and more specific concepts of trust such as brand trust 
and investigate their interactions. Broad-scope trust was found to be 
positively correlated with narrow-scope trust (Grayson, Johnson, 
and Chen 2008). This finding supported the institutionalists’ view 
that broad-scope trust is a catalyst of narrow-scope trust (Bachmann 
2004). If betrayal aversion is the mechanism, brand trust lowered by 
extended warranty offers should make consumers more suspicious 
in general and thus also decrease broad-scope trust. Similarly, low-
ered broad-scope trust should nurture the negative effect of selling 
extended warranties on narrow-scope trust. However, contrary to the 
predictions by the institutionalists, enhanced brand trust by bundling 
a lengthy warranty should not have an effect on general trust because 
it does not activate consumers’ betrayal aversion. In a similar vein, 
enhanced broad-scope trust should not restore hampered brand trust 
after betrayal aversion has been activated.
We finally identify the relationship based on different norms 
(Aggarwal 2004; Clark and Mills 1993) between firms and consum-
ers as a boundary condition. While relationships having a more inti-
mate and interpersonal character (i.e., relationships built on commu-
nal norm) are expected to be highly susceptible to the negative effect 
of selling extended warranty on brand trust, relationships having a 
rather matter-of-fact character (i.e., relationships built on exchange 
norm) are expected to be relatively immune to the betrayal effect.
Participants in study 1 (N=50) were recruited from MTurk. 
They were asked to imagine that they were looking for a purchase 
of a new television. We provided them with product information and 
told them that they would be interested to purchase the latest model 
from a (hypothetical) brand. We manipulated the company’s war-
ranty policy and assigned participants to one of three conditions: (1) 
warranty with five-year coverage, (2) control with regular one-year 
warranty, or (3) extended warranty offer by the company. The base 
warranty in (3) was the same as the one in (2). After the purchase of 
extended warranty, the scope and coverage of (1) and (3) were identi-
cal. Having raised some filler tasks, we asked participants to indicate 
their brand trust (Herbst et al. 2012). Confirming the assumptions 
behind the signaling literature, brand trust is enhanced if participants 
were shown the bundled warranty vs. the control condition. Most im-
portantly, compared with control, brand trust, however, was shaken 
after an offer to purchase an extended warranty.
Participants in study 2 (N=54) were recruited from MTurk. Dif-
ferent from study 1, participants were told that they were to take part 
in two seemingly unrelated studies. Having answered the first part 
of the study, we directed them to a trust game (Berg et al. 1996). We 
asked them to imagine that they had been given $10 and that they 
were able to send none, some, or all of it to an anonymous person 
whom they will never meet. On the way to this person, the amount 
would be tripled and the other person could decide on how much 
money she would send back to the participant. Contrast analysis re-
veals a spillover effect of lowered narrow-scope trust on lowered 
broad-scope trust but no positive spillover of enhanced narrow-scope 
trust. Participants were both willing to send the highest amount of 
money to the other person and expected the other person to send the 
highest amount of money back to them if they were offered to pur-
chase an extended warranty in the seemingly unrelated study.
Study 3 (N=50) was conducted online with students from a 
European business school. Prior to the main study, we implemented 
a seemingly unrelated study to manipulate their broad-scope trust. 
They either had to elaborate on a situation they could trust somebody 
or on a situation they felt betrayed. A control condition in which they 
had to write a story based on a few pictures with neutral contents was 
added. In the main study, all participants saw condition (3) in study 
1 in which they were exposed to an extended warranty offer. As hy-
pothesized, we found brand trust to be lowest if participants had been 
previously exposed to the betrayal prime but not significantly higher 
in the trust prime versus the control condition. 
Results from studies 2 and 3 together support the betrayal 
aversion explanation. Whereas both lowered narrow- and lowered 
broad-scope trust spilled over, enhanced trust did not. Alternatively, 
as pointed out above, having reminded participants that there is a 
nonzero chance of the product to break down provides another pos-
sibility to trigger the effect. However, without invoking the concept 
of betrayal, it cannot explain results in studies 2 and 3. 
Study 4 (N=94) was conducted in the experimental lab of an 
Asian business school and employed a 2 (extended warranty offer: 
present vs. absent) × 2 (relationship norm: communal vs. exchange) 
between-subjects design. Participants were either offered to purchase 
an extended warranty or they were assigned to a control condition 
only mentioning the regular warranty. As a second factor, we ma-
nipulated the relationship norm between the firm and the consumer 
(Aggarwal 2004). Our results reveal a significant interaction between 
both factors on brand trust. Whereas the extended warranty offer 
hurts brand trust in communal relationships, the contrast is non-sig-
nificant in the exchange relationship condition. 
Overall, our research captures another tension between short-
term value appropriation and long-term value creation (Mizik and 
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Jacobson 2003). It further identifies that consumers are vulnerable 
to the activation of betrayal aversion which is responsible for the 
negative effect of selling extended warranties on brand trust. Build-
ing on relationship norm theory, the findings highlight that trying to 
establish long-term relationships with consumers by means of com-
munal norms (Aggarwal and Larrick 2012; Fournier 1998) eventu-
ally backfires if firms simultaneously intend to profit from the sales 
of extended warranties.
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